Israel’s offensive: Why now?

Once again the situation in the Middle East has flared, with Israel launching air raids and ground incursions into Gaza. I find this particular action unsettling and risky for the simple reason that Israel does not seem to have defined what precisely they are trying to accomplish. Insofar as they have done so, it seems the offensive is unlikely to achieve the goals that have been set. In the meantime, the increased violence will only serve to strengthen radicals on both sides.  

Members of the Cabinet and the IDF have used the phrase “all out war with Hamas” on several occasions.  Yet, they have also said that the strikes have the “limited” goal of eliminating Hamas’ ability to launch rockets at Gaza. In either case, I find it difficult to imagine the Israelis succeeding. If this is framed as an all out war with Hamas, then Israel has already stacked the deck against itself. In order to declare victory in such a war, all that Hamas has to do is survive. Given Hamas’ sheer numbers (estimated at about 20,000 men at arms), and their close connection to the local population, it is inevitable that much of Hamas’ command structure and even weapons will survive these operations. When they do, and Israel leaves, Hamas will declare that it has scored a major victory against Israeli aggression. 

The more “limited” goal of eliminating Hamas’ ability to launch rockets seems equally unrealistic. The majority of Hamas rockets are cheap and home made, the materials used to make them are easy to smuggle into Gaza, and they can be fired from just about anywhere. It seems unlikely that any amount of Israeli bombardment will eliminate Hamas’ ability to launch them. Once again, if Israel frames its offensive in this way, all that Hamas has to do to declare victory is survive, preserve half a dozen rockets, and begin rearming. 

Another rationale put forward by observers is that, after the failure of their July 2006 incursion against Hezbollah, Israel needs a tactical win against Hamas to re-establish the credibility of its deterrence. To the extent that the deterrence is directed against neighbouring states, this is unnecessary. Israel has a massive military advantage against all of its neighbours and they are all quite aware of that fact. To the extent that the deterrence is directed against Hamas, the action taken will be ineffective. The simple reason is that Hamas does not fear Israeli strikes against Gaza, it welcomes them. These strikes and the civilian casualties they cause simply galvanize Hamas’ base of support. Hamas can now paint itself as the only group that is able and willing to oppose Israel and fight for Palestinians. Inversely, by sitting on the sidelines, the PLO become discredited and appear weak and unprincipled for their refusal and inability to mount an armed resistance. Neighbouring governments, already struggling for credibility, are painted with the same brush. The logic of violence strengthens radicals willing to use violence and discredits moderates who are not. Hamas knows this and so is not deterred by the prospect of violence. 

My own opinion is that the Israeli offensive has much more to do with events in Washington than Gaza. The Bush Administration has been very sympathetic to Israeli military actions. Given the current transitional phase in Washington, it is less likely than ever to mount any real pressure on Israel to commit to a cease-fire. The Obama Administration is unlikely to endorse such policies in the way that Bush has. This means that if Israel hopes to exercise the military option against Hamas, now is the time that it will have the most room to manoeuvre. It seems to me that Israel is taking this opportunity in order to weaken Hamas as much as possible and present the Obama Administration with a very different status quo than existed two weeks ago.   

Such a decision has some merit as a tactic, but in the long term it is an unwise strategy for the same reason that attempts at deterrence are unwise. Although Israeli strikes may weaken Hamas’ ability to launch rockets in the short term, they strengthen Hamas’ legitimacy among and its connection to the Palestinians of Gaza.  Tunnels can be rebuilt and more arms smuggled in. When they are, Hamas will be stronger than ever.